txcyber.net — infrastructure / power
Texas power & grid cybersecurity
Attackers have already sat inside a small-town public power utility for most of a year. Texas has 76 electric co-ops and about 72 city-owned utilities. This page is for their staff, city managers and emergency managers.
power sector watch
ercot~90% of texas load
freeE-ISAC · CISA
reviewedNov 22, 2026
01 / CASE STUDY
300 days inside a small public power utility
Littleton, Massachusetts runs no power plants and is not part of the bulk electric system. Its general manager thought nobody would bother with it. He was wrong, and his account is the most useful thing a small Texas utility can read this year.
>_ replay --incident 2023 --utility littleton
~300 days
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Feb 2023
intrusion
A Chinese state-sponsored group tracked as Volt Typhoon gets into the network of Littleton Electric Light and Water Departments, a public utility serving about 15,000 people in two Massachusetts towns.
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Fall 2023
sensors
The utility is installing operational technology sensors through a cooperative agreement between the American Public Power Association and the Department of Energy.
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Nov 2023
discovered
The week before Thanksgiving, the FBI calls the general manager: Littleton is one of about 200 critical infrastructure victims. The new sensors confirm the activity and show where the attackers went.
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After
rebuilt
With CISA’s help the utility rebuilds its network so key systems are isolated from one another, and drops the managed service provider.
// what the general manager says to do
- Pay for a vulnerability assessment first. Until you know your risks, it is hard to do anything else.
- Get to know your FBI field office before you need it. He verified the call by phoning the local office himself.
- Use the free federal services: CISA scans and penetration tests.
- Share what you find with other utilities, so everyone learns from it.
// weak spots named afterward
- A firewall patch the managed service provider had not finished.
- A flat network: anyone with admin credentials could reach all of it.
- Key passwords that were not changed regularly.
APPA interview ↗ (opens in a new tab)Dragos case study (PDF) ↗ (opens in a new tab)The Register ↗ (opens in a new tab)
>_ consult --plans --ttx
texas readiness partners
// need a hand with this?
Plans, reviews and tabletop exercises for small and mid-sized Texas organizations
Plan development · Plan review · Tabletop exercises · Business impact review
Tx Cyber Net is free and stays free. Paid help comes from Texas Readiness Partners, LLC, the Texas company that runs it.
>_ request --cyber-imt
24 hours
Need people to help run the response?
A Cyber Incident Management Team is available through National Emergency Management & Response. It brings incident command structure to a cyber event: organizing the response, planning, communications and coordination with your emergency management, IT and outside partners, so your people can work the problem.
A team supports your response; it does not replace your required reports. Tx Cyber Net is not sponsored or endorsed by National EMR.
02 / TEXAS GRID
How Texas power is set up, and why it matters here
03 / FREE HELP
Help available now, at no or low cost
start here · free from tx cyber net
The Tx Cyber Net resource library
Ready-to-use tools built for Texas organizations: tabletop exercise packages with injects and facilitator guides, business impact analysis tools, cyber annexes for your emergency operations plan, cyber hygiene assessments and everyday templates. Download them, adapt them to your operation and put them to work. Free, no sign-up.
open the library →
E-ISAC
The electricity sector’s threat-sharing center. Membership is free for electricity asset owners and operators, co-ops and city utilities included.
www.publicpower.org ↗ (opens in a new tab)
PUC Cybersecurity Monitor
Texas’s outreach program for utilities: threat briefings, best practices and a confidential channel to the PUC. Mandatory for some, open to others.
www.ercot.com ↗ (opens in a new tab)
DOE rural & municipal help
Announced October 1, 2026: $100 million for nonprofits to deliver assessments, training, exercises and tools to co-op, city and small investor-owned utilities. Ask your association whether it is taking part.
www.energy.gov ↗ (opens in a new tab)
CISA free services
Vulnerability scanning, penetration testing and assessments at no cost. Littleton’s general manager recommends them.
www.cisa.gov ↗ (opens in a new tab)
APPA and NRECA
Public power: APPA’s cybersecurity resources and sensor program for small utilities. Co-ops: NRECA’s RC3 self-assessment toolkit, free to members.
www.publicpower.org ↗ (opens in a new tab)
Texas Cyber Command
24/7 hotline (877) 347‑2476 for public utilities, plus statewide threat intelligence.
www.txcc.texas.gov ↗ (opens in a new tab)
04 / THE FIVE ACTIONS
What CISA, the FBI, EPA and DOE ask every utility to do
From their joint fact sheet, Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology. Written for every sector that runs control systems, power included.
>_ checklist --ot
5 actions
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01
Remove OT connections to the public internet. Relay, SCADA, metering and substation gear should not answer from the open internet. CISA’s free scanning will tell you if yours does.
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02
Change default passwords immediately and use strong, unique passwords. Including on vendor-installed devices and the accounts your contractors use.
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03
Secure remote access to OT networks. Vendor and staff remote access behind a VPN with phishing-resistant MFA, only for the people and hours that need it.
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04
Segment IT and OT networks. Email and billing should not be able to reach the control network. Littleton’s network was flat; separating key systems was the fix.
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05
Practice and maintain the ability to operate OT systems manually. Know how to run the system by hand, and exercise it with your emergency manager.
Fact sheet at cisa.gov ↗ (opens in a new tab)
05 / OBLIGATIONS
What applies to Texas electric utilities
Which rules bind you depends on what you own. A city utility is also a local government; a co-op that owns no 60 kV transmission and is not a registered bulk system entity has the fewest formal duties, and no less risk.
>_ sector --energy
3 rules
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1 h
Bulk electric system entities: initial report of a Reportable Cyber Security Incident to the E-ISAC and CISA within one hour of determination; attempted compromises by the end of the next calendar day. NERC CIP-008-6 ↗ (opens in a new tab)
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note
Municipal and cooperative providers that report to ERCOT under Utilities Code §39.151 are exempt from the state 48-hour report for those incidents. Gov’t Code §2063.302 ↗ (opens in a new tab)
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note
PUC Cybersecurity Monitor program: every transmission and distribution utility, and every ERCOT-region city utility or co-op that owns or operates 60 kV+ transmission, is a monitored utility (outreach, threat sharing, voluntarily shared self-assessments; no penalties). Utilities entirely outside ERCOT may opt in for a yearly fee ($4,150.10 for 2026). 16 TAC §25.367 ↗ (opens in a new tab)