AI, Black October and the Optimizely Supply Chain Hack

AI, Black October and the Optimizely Supply Chain Hack

Sunday night at 10:21 p.m. Central, someone changed a few lines of JavaScript inside the BBC’s Optimizely account. Nobody at the BBC touched it. Nobody at the BBC had to. By Monday afternoon the same code was running in the browsers of people visiting Zoom, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Fox News and NPR, all delivered through a website testing service most of their visitors have never heard of.

That’s 178 organizations. Scott Helme’s team at Report URI checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found the malicious code in 188 of them. Helme believes the real count is higher, since his team could only sweep what it reached in time.

Some of those companies have the deepest security benches in the country. Equifax. HSBC. Salesforce. It didn’t matter, because none of their own servers were breached. You can have the best cybersecurity personnel / contractors money can buy, but if you don’t know your supply chain standards, you are 100% vulnerable and can be pushed out of business. The attacker never went after them directly. They went after a vendor every one of them had already let inside the house.

How the Optimizely script injection worked

Optimizely Web is an A/B testing tool. A company adds a small script to its pages, the script loads from cdn.optimizely.com, and the marketing team can test two versions of a button without opening a ticket with IT. Inside every customer project is a field called Project JavaScript that runs on every page the snippet touches. That’s where the attacker wrote. The rest of the file was untouched and still came from Optimizely’s own domain with Optimizely’s own certificate, which is why browsers and most security controls treated it as trusted.

The payload did four things. It swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses on the page and in the clipboard for the attacker’s. Starting Monday morning it skimmed card numbers, expiration dates and CVVs typed into forms. When a page mentioned wallets or payments, it sent cookies and a screenshot back to the attacker. And on iPhones and iPads it loaded the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits in a hidden frame. Report URI says iOS 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, are patched. Cynet described what it saw as delivery inside an emulated browser, and nobody has confirmed a real phone taken over.

About $7,040 in crypto reached the attacker’s wallets in roughly nine hours. How many card numbers left is unknown.

Tick tock: two months, then sixteen hours

All times Central, converted from the UTC timeline Report URI published.

  • Sept. 17: The same actor’s injector, webshell.lol, first shows up on Turkish websites through an SEO backlink script.
  • Nov. 9: A domain used to route iPhone visitors to the exploit kits is registered.
  • Nov. 13–15: An earlier wave rides in through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts.
  • Sun., Nov. 15, 8:21 p.m.: Last clean copy of the BBC’s Optimizely snippet.
  • 10:21 p.m.: First Optimizely injection seen.
  • Mon., Nov. 16, 2:28 a.m.: Crypto-swapping script live on bbc.com.
  • 5:20 a.m.: Zoom’s snippet modified.
  • 7:43 a.m.: Card skimmer added.
  • 11:13–11:57 a.m.: iOS exploit frame injected into every visit from iOS 18.6 or earlier.
  • 1:24–1:59 p.m.: Report URI sweep finds 186 of 1,611 snippets infected.
  • 2:40 p.m.: Mass cleanup starts.
  • 3:52 p.m.: One infected snippet left, TalkTalk’s.
  • 7:02 p.m.: Optimizely posts its incident notice.

The code was live about 16 hours before cleanup started, and the payload was rebuilt 26 times that day. The longer clock is the one that bothers me. The tooling behind this was seen in the wild two months earlier, and the same injector hit three other marketing vendors days before Optimizely. When Report URI published, it said it had reached out to Optimizely and hadn’t heard back.

Optimizely’s notice says an unauthorized party “exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation” and that the company has fixed it, removed the code and secured affected accounts. A spokesperson told iTWire the flaw was in the Experimentation account signup flow. How a signup flaw gave one attacker write access to 178 unrelated customers’ projects hasn’t been explained.

What to check on your own public sites this week

Start with an inventory. Every third-party script on every public site you run: the city homepage, the utility billing portal, the school district’s enrollment page, the alert sign-up form. For each one, find out who owns the account, who has write access, and which API tokens and integrations can change it. Most of the time that isn’t IT. It’s communications, or a marketing contractor, or a vendor somebody hired in 2019 who still has an admin login.

If you run Optimizely, Report URI’s guidance is specific: review every Project JavaScript field and experiment’s custom code for 1688360.cc, atob( and anything you don’t recognize, rotate credentials, and treat card data entered on Nov. 16 as exposed.

Then look at your Content Security Policy, which tells the browser which scripts a page may load and where it may send data. Of 256 affected organizations Report URI crawled, 68 had no CSP at all, and only 24 had one strict enough to stop the payload. Allowing Optimizely’s domain in a CSP did nothing, because the malware came from that domain. Optimizely’s recommended setting that permits eval let a backup copy of the code run on HSBC’s site. And tell your staff to update their iPhones.

Is AI behind Black October?

It’s obvious to me that AI is involved in Black October and the attacks that have kept coming through the writing of this article. On that piece of it, I’m not guessing. On Oct. 21, Microsoft said a China-state aligned group it tracks as Storm-0940 used an agentic AI penetration testing framework called ARTEX to automate attacks on hundreds of organizations, then used stolen ConnectWise application credentials to try more than 2,250 Microsoft 365 tenants at 2,900 sign-in attempts per minute. That one was a supply chain attack too. The customers had already approved the ConnectWise apps.

Nobody has tied the Optimizely attack to AI. Minimal sources on that point, and I’ll say it plainly so nobody quotes me wrong. But 26 rebuilds of the payload in one day, a fresh domain registered the morning of, a second iPhone exploit host stood up by lunch — that’s the pace I’d expect from someone with an AI coding agent doing the grunt work. As MoneyWeek put it, AI hasn’t invented new attacks so much as let attackers run old ones at a speed and scale defenders don’t have.

Optimizely was breached once already this year. On Feb. 11, attackers got into internal systems through a voice phishing call, ShinyHunters claimed it, and the exposed data was basic business contact information. There’s no evidence the two incidents are connected. I’d still like to know how many of those 178 companies went back and looked at who could write to their Optimizely projects after February.

When someone just buys your vendor

This could even lead to competitors buying your supply chain providers and then attack you and diminish you. That sounds paranoid until you remember Polyfill. In February 2024 a Chinese company called Funnull bought the polyfill.io domain and its GitHub account. By June the script was injecting malicious redirects into more than 100,000 websites that had loaded it for years. Nobody hacked anything. They bought it. A competitor, or a foreign-owned firm with its own reasons, could buy the small analytics company or the form builder your public site depends on, and the first you’d hear of it is the change in your vendor’s privacy policy, if you read those.

Texas did the right thing with TX-RAMP. The Department of Information Resources certifies cloud services before state agencies can contract for them, and I’m proud the state got ahead of most of the country on that. But TX-RAMP certifies a cloud service. It doesn’t tell you a marketing script on your homepage changed at 10:21 on a Sunday night, and it doesn’t follow a change in who owns the vendor. And the DIR page on who has to comply names state agencies, institutions of higher education and public community colleges. Cities, counties and school districts aren’t on it.

Author

  • Jason Arms

    Jason Arms brings 25+ years of experience spanning information technology, law enforcement, radio communications, fire service, and emergency management. He has deployments across Texas, having served in emergency management coordination roles for city and county jurisdictions, as a police sergeant, and as deputy manager for large-scale interoperable radio communications systems supporting thousands of public-safety users across a multi-agency region. He has also led municipal IT, emergency management, and communications operations in Texas.
    [email protected]

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